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1. INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 1982, the United States Trade Representative an-
nounced the formulation of a prototype Bilateral Investment Treaty
(Model BIT).' The BIT program is one aspect of the Reagan Admin-
istration's program for improving the climate for investment and capital
flows worldwide, especially to the Less Developed Countries (LDCs).
2
The Reagan administration stresses that concluding BITs with devel-
oping countries will enhance the attractiveness of these countries to
U.S. investors by establishing a common frame of reference and com-
mitment as well as a legal base for dealing with the complex problems
that accompany direct private investment in any foreign nation.' The
Reagan administration wants to move away from the position of neu-
trality on foreign investment announced by President Carter in 1977," a
policy that neither promoted nor discouraged inward or outward invest-
ment flows. It is President Reagan's belief that "[a] world with strong
* J.D. candidate, 1987, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1982, Yale
University.
1 Treaty Between the United States of America and Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Revised Draft of Jan. 21,
1983, reprinted in Recent Development, Developing a Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273, A-1 (1983) [hereinafter Model BIT]. This
version of the treaty was the prototype from which all BITs were created. For a look at
other model BITs, see Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Proposed by the U.S. Trade
Representative, U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 400, at 734 (Mar. 23, 1982) (1982
version); Text of the U.S. Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment of February 24, 1984, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 136
(1986) (1984 version).
2 See, e.g., International Meeting on Cooperation and Development, 17 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1185, 1185-88, 1189-91 (Nov. 2, 1981); see also Hearings before
the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 202-13 (1982) [hereinafter Bale Statement]
(statement of Harvey Bale, Jr., Assistant U.S. Trade Representative).
3 Bale Statement, supra note 2, at 211.
4 Id. at 203.
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foreign investment flows is the opposite of a zero-sum game. We believe
there are only winners, no losers and all participants gain from it."5
Historically, the United States relied on Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation (FCNs) to facilitate trade between itself and
other nations.6 The discontent over the general nature of the provisions
in the FCNs7 as well as the success achieved by European countries in
concluding BITs with both developing and developed nations8 led the
United States to develop its own BIT program. Added impetus to the
BIT program resulted from the U.S. business community's unhappi-
ness with the Carter administration's neutrality stance and the commu-
nity's concern that other countries were increasing the amount of re-
strictions they placed on foreign investment.9 The purpose of the BIT
program is to provide assurances to foreign investors that they will re-
ceive: (1) either national' or most-favored-nation treatment" for their
investments; (2) adequate compensation in the event of expropriation or
nationalization; (3) the ability to transfer capital and profits relating to
their investments to other countries, including the United States; and
(4) the right to obtain international arbitration for investment
disputes.12
Although the United States has signed treaties with Bangladesh,
Cameroon, Egypt, Grenada, Haiti, Morocco, Panama, Senegal, Tur-
key, and Zaire,'" there are indications that the treaty program may face
' Administration Announces Official Stance on International Investment, 8 U.S.
Import Weekly (BNA) No. 23, at 879-80 (Sept. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Administration
Announcement].
I See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 498 (1986)
(the United States has concluded 130 such treaties since the 18th century; 40 of those
treaties are still in force); Asken, The Case For Bilateral Investment Treaties, in SYM-
POSIUM FOR PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 1981, at 357, 382-90 (M. Landwehr ed.
1981) (listing U.S. FCNs currently in force).
' See Asken, supra note 6, at 367-73; Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1958) [hereinafter Modern FCN];
Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Pre-
sent United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956) [hereinafter U.S. Practice].
' See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 5 (1977) (by the late 1970s, 180 BITs
among 65 states had been negotiated).
9 Administration Announcement, supra note 5, at 879.
'0 Under a national treatment standard, a nation gives foreign investors the same
rights and privileges with respect to investments as it gives to its own nationals. See
Model BIT, supra note 1, art. II, para. 1.
1 The most-favored-nation standard means that foreign investors will be treated
the same as the most favored of all third-party investors. See Model BIT, supra note 1,
art. II, para. 1.
12 First U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Between U.S. and African Nation
Signed, 20 U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 11, at 448 (Dec. 13, 1983) [hereinafter
U.S.-Africa Signing].
Is Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
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some formidable, if not insurmountable, obstacles.' There are elements
in the BIT program that indicate it may have only limited success in
reaching the goals it has set. Specific problem areas of the Model BIT
include its lack of flexibility and its espousal of provisions that are di-
rectly opposed to the interests of many developing nations. This com-
ment will focus on the inherent limitations of the U.S. BIT program as
proposed and thus far conducted. The analysis will focus on three of
the earliest treaties signed by the United States, those with Egypt, Pan-
ama, and Turkey. Section 2 will deal with the development of the U.S.
BIT program and the standards that have been included in the treaties
concluded under this program. Section 3 will present an interpretation
of the results of the current BIT program and will offer several varia-
tions on the standard Model BIT that may make the Model BIT more
acceptable to many developing countries.
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. MODEL BIT
2.1. The Inadequacy of the FCN Framework
Traditionally, the United States concluded Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation 15 as the basis for negotiating all aspects of
ments, May 2, 1986, United States-Grenada; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal En-
couragement and Protection of Investments, Mar. 12, 1986, United States-Bangladesh;
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Feb.
27, 1986, United States-Cameroon; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investments, Dec. 1985, United States-Turkey, reprinted in 25
I.L.M. [hereinafter U.S.-Turkey BIT]; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Aug. 3, 1984, United States-Zaire;
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Mar.
1, 1984, United States-Morocco; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investments, Dec. 6, 1983, United States-Haiti; Treaty Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Dec. 6, 1983, United
States-Senegal [hereinafter U.S.-Senegal BIT]; Treaty Concerning the Treatment and
Protection of Investments, Oct. 27, 1982, United States-Panama, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 1227 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama BIT]; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal En-
couragement and Protection of Investments, Sept. 29, 1982, United States-Egypt, re-
printed in 21 I.L.M. 927 [hereinafter U.S.-Egypt BIT].
14 See U.S.-Panama Investment Treaty Signed But Problems Remain Before Rat-
ifying, 18 U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 5, at 170 (Nov. 2, 1982) [hereinafter U.S.-
Panama Signing] (detailing Panama's objection to the BIT program); see also U.S.-
Morocco Initial Bilateral Investment Treaty During State Visit to Washington, 20
U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 23, at 755 (Mar. 13, 1984) [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco
Initialing] (Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Harvey Bale discussing problems in
concluding both the Egyptian and Panamanian treaties); Administration Considering
Simplifying Bilateral Investment Treaties with LDCs, 20 U.S. Export Weekly (BNA)
No. 7, at 279 (Nov. 15, 1983) [hereinafter Simplification of BITs] (Bale enumerating
problems encountered in negotiating BITs).
" See, e.g. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954,
United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, 4
1987]
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its relationship with other nations." Although the treaties were modi-
fied over time to incorporate newer problems17 such as investment, they
remained treaties concerned with the protection of persons and property
abroad, rather than treaties addressing the particular problems of for-
eign private investment.1 8 Current criticisms of these treaties stress the
general nature of the provisions and the lack of attention to specific
investment issues and concerns.19 In this context, BITs are seen as a
beneficial new development because they focus on narrower objectives
and enumerate specific ways of regulating the establishment and con-
trol of foreign investments.2 0 Yet, there have been rumblings of discon-
tent among the nations negotiating these treaties with the United States
that have created difficulties in concluding these treaties at all."
Although it has been suggested that BITs are in reality no differ-
ent than FCNs, 22 a comparison of the FCN and the European BIT
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter U.S.-Japan FCNI; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 26, 1951, United States-Greece, 5 U.S.T. 1829,
T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951,
United States-Israel, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, United States-Ireland, 1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S.
No. 2155; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, United
States-Italy, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, United States-Republic of China, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S.
No. 1871 [hereinafter U.S.-Republic of China FCN].
18 See Modern FCN, supra note 7; U.S. Practice, supra note 7.
17 See Modern FCN, supra note 7, at 805-06 (the first FCN was concluded be-
tween the United States and France in 1778, the last was concluded between the
United States and.Thailand in 1966).
a See Modern FCN, supra note 7, at 806; U.S. Practice, supra note 7, at 230-31.
19 See Asken, supra note 6, at 367-73; Bergman, Bilateral Investment Protection
Treaties: An Examination of the Evolution and Significance of the U.S. Prototype
Treaty, 16 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 1, 7 (1983); Note, The BIT Won't Bite: The
American Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 931, 940-41
(1984).
20 An example of a specific provision in the Model BIT is Article III, outlining
each party's obligation to compensate foreign private companies for expropriation of
their investments. Model BIT, supra note 1, art. III, para. 2; see also Asken, supra
note 6, at 376; Pattison, United States-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, 16 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 305, 312 (1983).
21 The Panamanian Ambassador to the United States, Aquilino Boyd, stated to
the group assembled at the signing of the U.S.-Panama BIT that "he questioned
whether it was worth compromising principles such as the 'sanctity of our tribunals,' in
order to attract more U.S. investment." U.S.-Panama Signing, supra note 14, at 170.
The Egyptian Parliament was extremely reluctant to ratify the U.S.-Egyptian BIT due
to its reluctance to relinquish sovereignty over certain sensitive areas of the Egyptian
economy. Government Seeking Bilateral Investment Treaty with Japan as well as
LDCs, 7 U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) No. 21, at 685 (Mar. 2, 1983) [hereinafter U.S.
Seeking BIT With Japan]. Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Harvey Bale stated
that, as a general matter, he expected to have trouble negotiating BITs because invest-
ment in a developing country is a particularly sensitive political issue. Id.
22 Sachs, The 'New' U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 192, 193 (1984).
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program with the Model BIT illustrates that the Model BIT is not
only quite different from a standard FCN,2' but also quite different
from the European BIT program.2 4 FCNs evolved into treaties that
addressed the problems of foreign private investment after World War
II."5 Even this new shift towards dealing with the problems of invest-
ment failed to provide much protection to the individual investor. FCN
investment provisions are vague26 and do not clearly address the key
issues of interest to private investors.2 7 At the same time, the United
States has also failed to sign FCNs with many nations where investors
believe they need the protections of a treaty program.28 BITs, on the
other hand, are treaties directly concerned with the problems faced by
private investors abroad and with providing the greatest possible
amount of protection for these individuals.
The European BIT program has been described as a program
whose "agreements are not confined to a recital of general principles,
but rather attempt to establish the most comprehensive protection for
investment.12 9 Comparing the FCNs, the European BIT program, and
the U.S. BIT program, the U.S. program appears to be the least flexi-
ble. This is where its inherent problems lie. The United States' pattern
of success in concluding BITs indicates that only countries that are
heavily dependent on the United States for aid will be willing to adopt
the Model BIT as proposed. Numerous other developing nations, how-
ever, will refuse to conclude BITs with the United States unless the
provisions are modified.8 0 The United States has signed but not ratified
treaties with Bangladesh, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Egypt, Grenada, Ha-
iti, Morocco, Panama, Senegal, Turkey, and Zaire. Negotiations are
also underway with Antigua, Burma, Burundi, The People's Republic
of China, El Salvador, Gabon, and Honduras. The test will be to de-
2 See Modern FCN, supra note 7, at 810-15; U.S. Practice, supra note 7, at 230-
39.
24 See Bergman, supra note 19, at 18.
23 Modern FCN, supra note 7, at 806-09.
The treaties do not define such terms as "expropriation" or "prompt and just
compensation." See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21,
1956, United States-Nicaragua, art. VI, para. 4, 9 U.S.T. 451, 454, T.I.A.S. No. 4024.
27 FCNs do not clearly define when expropriation takes place, leaving open the
question of when "creeping expropriation" has occurred and thus when compensation
is owed. See S. RUBIN, PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 29 (1956).
28 The United States currently has FCNs in force with 43 nations. See Brower,
International Legal Protection of United States Investment Abroad, in A LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACTIONS 53 (1981).
" See Bergman, supra note 19, at 11.
20 For an opposing view on the position of the developing countries in relation to
aid and BIT programs in general, see INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, MON-
TREAL CONFERENCE, PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND STATE
PRACTICE 25 (1982) [hereinafter MONTREAL CONFERENCE].
1987]
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termine, given that these countries are unwilling to accept the Model
BIT, whether variations of the Model BIT can be created that preserve
the BIT's beneficial aspects for the foreign investor while expanding its
acceptability to the developing countries.
2.2. Provisions of the Model BIT and Current U.S. BITs
The Model BIT addresses a series of issues governing the treat-
ment of foreign private investment in states that are parties to the
treaty. The following subsections discuss the primary targets of the
BIT program: performance requirements, standard of treatment, ex-
propriation and nationalization, monetary transfers, and the settlement
of investment disputes.
2.2.1. Performance Requirements
The Model BIT contains an absolute prohibition against a host
country's imposition of performance requirements"1 because they re-
strict the free flow of economic competition. 32 The United States classi-
fies as performance requirements such activities as export performance
requirements,"3 import substitution requirements, and local content re-
quirements." Restrictions such as those that stipulate the percentage of
the total product to be bought from local producers are viewed as a
distortion of international trade and investment policies.3 5 Although the
United States stresses the importance of banning performance require-
ments, it has had limited success in retaining this ban in the treaties
thus far concluded. While the U.S.-Panamanian BIT does forbid all
performance requirements, the Egyptian and Turkish BITs do not. 8
2.2.2. Standard of Treatment
The standard of treatment for foreign investment in a host country
is set out in the Model BIT as either a national or most-favored-nation
31 Model BIT, supra note 1, at art. II, para. 7.
3* Bale Statement, supra note 2, at 204.
33An example of an export performance requirement is when foreign investors
are required to export a minimum volume or percentage of their output, often as a
condition for an investment incentive. Id.
" Local content requirements and import substitution requirements divert
purchases of foreign-owned firms to local producers, often over favored foreign suppli-
ers. Id.
35 Id.
36 U.S.-Turkey BIT, supra note 13, art. II, para. 7 (stating that the parties shall
seek to avoid the imposition of performance requirements); U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra
note 13, art. II, para. 7 (providing merely that Egypt shall 'seek to avoid the imposition
of performance requirements').
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standard, whichever is more favorable to the investor. 37 The treaty par-
ties are allowed, however, to set out certain areas of their economies
where neither a national nor a most-favored-nation standard will ap-
ply. 8 While both Egypt and Panama have incorporated this basic stan-
dard into their treaties with the United States, 9 the Turkish provision
differs in what could be a substantial manner. The Turkish BIT pro-
vides that a most-favored-nation standard will exist for all investments
covered by the treaty, and then qualifies the potential application of the
national standard by phrasing it as "within the framework of its laws
and regulations, no less favorable than that accorded in like situations
to investments of its own nationals and companies."40 Depending on
the content of laws and regulations enacted by Turkey, this clause
could essentially limit the rights of U.S. investors in Turkey to rights of
only a most-favored-nation.
2.2.3. Expropriation and Nationalization
Article II of the Model BIT provides that parties are not to expro-
priate, nationalize, or take measures that would in effect be "creeping
expropriation" unless the expropriation: (1) is for a public purpose; (2)
is accomplished under due process of law; (3) is not discriminatory; (4)
is not in violation of any specific agreement between a national of one
party and the expropriating party; and (5) is accompanied by prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation. 4' The compensation provided is
to be the fair market value of the expropriated investment."2 The calcu-
lation of fair market value is not to reflect any reduction in the invest-
ment's value caused by the announcement of the expropriatory action
or the occurrence of the acts that resulted in expropriation. Compensa-
tion is to be paid without delay and must be freely transferable at the
market rate of exchange on the day of expropriation.43
17 Model BIT, supra note 1, art. II, para. 1.
3S Id. art. II, paras. 3, 4. Exceptions are listed in the treaty's Annex. For exam-
ple, some of the U.S. reservations contained in the Model BIT are: air transportation,
ocean and coastal shipping, ownership of real estate, and use of land and natural re-
sources. Id. at Annex.
, U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 13, art. II, para. 1; U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note
13, art. II, para. 3.
40 U.S.-Turkey BIT, supra note 13, art. II, para. 1; cf. Pattison, supra note 20,
at 320 (discussing the potential danger of a clause in the Model BIT that would allow
host states' employment laws to take precedence over treaty provisions in the employ-
ment area).
41 Model BIT, supra note 1, art. III, para. 1.
42 Id.
43 Id.
1987]
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The Egyptian and Panamanian BITs4 4 follow the Model BIT on
the expropriation provision. The Turkish BIT contains a new aspect in
the compensation standard provision. The Turkish BIT provides that if
the payment of compensation is delayed, the compensation would be the
amount that would put the investor in a position no less favorable than
the investor would have been in had payment occurred on the date of
expropriation. 45 The Model BIT also provides for compensation if in-
vestments are damaged by war, revolution, insurrection, riots, or terror-
ism.4 6 All three treaties in force are similar to the Model BIT in this
47provision.
4
2.2.4. Monetary Transfers
The Model BIT also provides that all monetary transfers related
to the foreign investment may be freely transferred out of the territory,
without delay, in the currency selected by the investor.48 While the
Panamanian BIT follows the Model BIT closely,' 9 Egypt and Turkey
each have a reservation attached to this provision.50 The Protocols of
both the Egyptian and Turkish treaties state that if the foreign ex-
change reserves of the country fall to a low level, the host countries are
allowed to delay all monetary transfers.5"
2.2.5. Investment Disputes
A detailed outline of how investment disputes should be settled is
contained in the Model BIT.5' Although three different types of invest-
ment disputes are identified in the treaty, the one primarily addressed
is a disagreement between a national or company of one party and the
host party. 53 A detailed procedure is outlined in the Model BIT by
which the parties, after consultation and negotiation have failed, can
mutually agree to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Interna-
4, U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 13, art. IV, para. 1; U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra
note 13, art. III, para. 1.
45 U.S.-Turkey BIT, supra note 13, art. III, para. 2.
40 Model BIT, supra note 1, art. IV, para. 1.
4' U.S.-Turkey BIT, supra note 13, art. III, para. 4; U.S.-Panama BIT, supra
note 13, art. V; U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 13, art. IV.
4 Model BIT, supra note 1, art. V, paras. 1,2.
49 U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 13, art. VI.
50 U.S.-Turkey BIT, supra note 13, at Protocol, para. 2(b); U.S.-Egypt BIT,
supra note 13, at Protocol, para. 6.
51 U.S.-Turkey BIT, supra note 13, at Protocol, para. 2(b); U.S.-Egypt BIT,
supra note 13, at Protocol, para. 6.
5 Model BIT, supra note 1, art. VII.
53 Id. art. VII, para. 1.
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tional Court of Justice.54 Alternatively, at the request of one party, af-
ter a certain length of time, the dispute may be submitted to third party
arbitration. 5 The Model BIT expressly suggests that, in the absence of
a specific arbitral procedure agreement between the parties, the third
party arbiter for the investment dispute could be the International Cen-
tre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 8 All three trea-
ties vary only slightly from the Model BIT on the dispute provision.
As this discussion indicates, the Model BIT covers a great many of
the key areas of interest to the foreign private investor. The deviations
from the Model BIT in the Egyptian and Turkish treaties and the
general disagreement among many developing countries over the stan-
dards embodied in these provisions, however, indicate the areas of diffi-
culty that may arise in future attempts to conclude treaties based on
this Model.
57
2.3. Problematical Provisions in the Model BIT
Several provisions in the Model BIT have proven to be problem-
atic in negotiations and are not likely to serve as universal standards in
the future.5 8 Difficulties have arisen over the following: (1) the implica-
tions of the "Calvo" doctrine59 and its effect on the dispute settlement
mechanism proposed by the United States; (2) the U.S. insistence on
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the event of nationali-
zation or expropriation; (3) the U.S. desire for the status and treatment
as a national rather than merely as a most-favored-nation; and (4) the
U.S. policy against governmentally mandated performance require-
ments. 0 An examination of these provisions and the reasons why devel-
oping nations object to them will help to illustrate how the Model BIT
should be modified.
2.3.1. Investment Disputes
The United States has had difficulty in gaining acceptance of the
dispute settlement provision of the Model BIT in part because it runs
" Id. art. VIII, para. 2.
51 Id. art. VIII, para. 2.
56 Id. art. VIII, para. 2. The ICSID was established by the World Bank in 1965
at the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 3.
" U.S.-Turkey BIT, supra note 13, art. VI; U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 13,
art. VII; U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 13, art. VII.
58 Simplification of BITs, supra note 14, at 279.
"I See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
60 Simplification of BITs, supra note 14, at 279.
19871
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.[
counter to the principles of the Calvo doctrine."1 The Calvo doctrine
insists on the strict abstention from interference by other nations in ar-
eas within the host country's exclusive control.62 A majority of Latin-
American countries adhere to the Calvo doctrine, and it appears in
many Latin-American international conventions and investment con-
tracts.6" Two areas of special concern to the Latin-American states are
the adjudication of disputes involving resources or conduct within their
borders and the control over compensation for acts of nationalization or
expropriation. 64 The Latin-American countries appear to be unwilling
to give up their position on the Calvo doctrine,6 5 and whether or not
their position is based on real fears of foreign intervention and partial-
ity in international tribunals, it remains a real stumbling block for the
U.S. BIT program.
Other countries, particularly The People's Republic of China
(PRC), object to the Model BIT's dispute resolution provision on dif-
ferent grounds. This provision has been the central objection of the
PRC to the Model BIT, 6 partially because the PRC concept of sover-
eignty differs from that of Western democracies, i.e., the PRC is un-
comfortable with the idea of an independent body having authority over
disputes.67 Other concerns of the Chinese about entering into a formal
investment treaty with the United States include: (1) fear that the
treaty will make it appear as though they are part of an imperialistic
61 The original source of the Calvo doctrine is the 1868 treatise on international
law by Carlos Calvo, an Argentine diplomat. See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N.
LEECH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1112
(1981). Two fundamental propositions form the Calvo doctrine. The first is that due to
the equality of all states, all states must be free from any intervention by a foreign
state. The second postulate states that diplomatic protection of an alien in a foreign
country is an impermissible interference with the independence of the nation. Id.
Therefore, an alien will be treated as though he were a national of the state in terms of
any grievances he may have against the state or against any individual within the state.
Id.; see also G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 635 (1943).
" See Rogers, Of Missionaries, Fanatics and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Invest-
ment Disputes in the Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1978); see also Szasz, The
Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 256, 260-62
(1971) (arguing that the Calvo doctrine should not stop Latin America from participat-
ing in ICSID).
63 See Rogers, supra note 62.
64 See id. at 3.
" For example, many Latin-American countries boycotted the World Bank Con-
vention and refused to sign the ICSID Draft Treaty. See id. at 3-4; Szasz, supra note
62, at 258.
6 U.S. Trade Representative Hopes to Deliver Eight Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties to Senate This Year, 9 U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) No. 32, at 1002, 1003 (May
16, 1984) [hereinafter U.S.T.R.] (statement of Assistant U.S. Trade Representative
Harvey Bale).
67 Id.
[Vol. 9:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss1/5
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY PROGRAM
economic program;"' (2) fear of partiality in Western tribunals; (3) an
aversion to the adversarial posture of Western law; and (4) the lack of
the use of the Chinese language in international tribunals. 9
It is interesting to note that many European countries do not insist
on the use of third party arbitration in their BIT programs.70 Although
the United States continues to assert that it does not wish individual
investment disputes to be settled on a government-to-government ba-
sis,7 1 its position may cause severe problems in treaty negotiations.
2.3.2. Expropriation and Nationalization
The antagonism of developing countries toward the standard of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation lies in their outlook on
the whole process of nationalization and expropriation.72 Developing
countries often view nationalization as part of a fundamental change in
the social and political framework of the nation. They perceive this
change as the result of the nation's attempt to reestablish control over
important areas of the economy and, often, to redistribute the wealth
within the society.78 The U.S. requirement of compensation based on a
fair market valuation of the investment is contrary to the political prin-
ciples on which nationalization is based. One commentator has noted
that it is both "unrealistic and patronizing" to expect "that states lack-
ing sufficient gold reserves, foreign exchange, or other financial re-
sources should not undertake social and economic reforms which may
"174necessitate enacting extensive deprivation laws".
While the United States believes that international law requires
the payment of the fair market value for expropriated investments, 75
6S Id.
69 Note, Far From the Tiger's Mouth: Present Practice and Future Prospects for
the Settlement of Foreign Commercial Disputes in the People's Republic of China, 3 J.
L. & COM. 115, 133 (1983).
70 See Voss, The Protection and Promotion of European Private Investment in
Developing Countries, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 363, 370 n.16 (1981) (for example,
West Germany incorporates diplomatic protections into its investment agreements).
7' U.S.T.R., supra note 66, at 1003.
72 See Muller, Compensation for Nationalization, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
35 (1981). See generally Bergman, supra note 19, at 37-38 (discussing how countries
often ultimately negotiate compensation); Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and
Effective": A Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 727
(1962) (providing a general analysis of the principle of compensation); Note, Host
Countries Attitudes Toward Foreign Investment, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 233, 243-
44 (1977) (discussing past attitudes of developing countries that there is a need to con-
trol foreign investment).
73 See Muller, supra note 72, at 45.
7" Dawson & Weston, supra note 72, at 738.
75 Smith, The United States Government Perspective on Expropriation and In-
vestment in Developing Countries, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 517, 519 (1976) (At
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many developing countries believe that their domestic law should deter-
mine the measure of compensation.7 6 Although the United States and
many of the developing countries may never agree on the principles
behind expropriation and nationalization, perhaps another standard of
compensation would provide an easier base from which to negotiate the
BITs. As alternatives to the fair market value approach, three standard
methods of indirect valuation used to approximate the fair market value
include the going concern approach, the replacement cost approach, and
the book value approach.7 In future negotiations, perhaps a middle
ground between a fair market valuation and a book valuation can be
found.
2.3.3. Standard of Treatment
The resistance of many developing nations to the adoption of a
standard of treatment incorporating a national standard, as opposed to
merely a most-favored-nation standard, again relates to issues of sover-
eignty and independence. Many Latin-American countries believe that
the policies of foreign governments are heavily influenced by their na-
tionals who operate businesses in Latin-American countries.78 Thus,
they view U.S. policies as designed to further U.S. citizens' business
concerns as well as international strategic concerns.79
Latin-American countries believe that the national treatment stan-
dard is the most advantageous standard for the foreign investor, but not
for the host country, because it guarantees that those investors will not
be discriminated against solely because they are foreigners. It has been
argued, though, that there are no reciprocal benefits for the host coun-
try. 0 Although the internal logic of the Calvo doctrine would seem to
suggest that a national standard would be acceptable to Latin-Ameri-
can countries, this is not often the case.8"
the time he gave this speech, Richard J. Smith was the Director of the Office of Invest-
ment Affairs, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State).
71 See, e.g., Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States ch. 2, art. 2(c), G.A.
Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, 52, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974).
' Smith, supra note 75, at 519. The going concern approach attempts to measure
earning power and, next to the fair market value approach, is the approach most fa-
vored by the United States. Id. The replacement cost approach calculates the replace-
ment cost of the property at the time of expropriation less actual depreciation. The
United States regards this standard as inadequate because it does not take into account
earning capacity. Id. The book value approach values the asset at the acquisition cost
less depreciation. This method is the least acceptable to the United States. Id.
78 Grunwald, Foreign Private Investment: The Challenge of Latin American Na-
tionalism, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 228, 232 (1971).
79 Id.
so See Bergman, supra note 19, at 27.
81 The Calvo doctrine stresses that foreigners should be treated the same as the
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European BITs, in contrast to the Model BIT, sometimes allow
the inclusion of only a most-favored-nation clause in the BIT provi-
sions.82 Those European BITs that do include a clause similar to that
contained in the Model BIT, providing for a national as well as a
most-favored-nation standard, often restrict the amount of activities
governed by the standard. 3 There have been some attempts to develop
a universal minimum standard of treatment for foreign investment,8
and this may be the best approach.
2.3.4. Performance Requirements
The inability of the United States to retain the performance re-
quirement prohibition clause in the Egyptian and Turkish BITs dem-
onstrates the existing opposition to this provision.85 The reluctance of
countries to ban performance requirements relates to a fear that un-
restricted private foreign investment may not be beneficial to their in-
terests."' They fear that foreign investment may subvert their national
policies in such areas as employment, pricing, regional development,
market competition, and foreign trade.8" Performance requirements also
serve a function for the developing countries by promoting their balance
of trade and fostering growth in local industries. 8 A contrast between
the European and American practices in this area can once again be
drawn. Not only is the United States the sole country to prohibit the
performance requirement standard in its BIT program, 9 but it is also
the only country that reserves the right to take action against the use of
performance requirements.90
citizens of the state. See Szasz, supra note 62, at 260-61.
82 See Bergman, supra note 19, at 12 (discussing the Sweden-People's Republic of
China Treaty).
88 Id. at 26.
4 Id. at 20. The proposed universal standard would merely require the host
country to treat investors in a manner no less beneficial than required by international
law. Id. This would create a universal minimum standard of treatment below which no
negotiated standard of treatment would be allowed to fall. Id.
85 U.S.-Turkey BIT, supra note 13, art. II, para. 7 (no performance require-
ments clause); U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 13, art. II, para. 4 (clause banning all
performance requirements); U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 13, art. II, para. 7 (no per-
formance requirements clause).
86 See Note, supra note 72, at 243.
87 Id. at 257.
88 Note, supra note 19, at 950.
89 See Bergman, supra note 19, at 31.
90 Administration Announcement, supra note 5, at 880.
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3. VARIATIONS ON THE MODEL
As this analysis has indicated, serious problems exist in the provi-
sions of the current Model BIT. The U.S. BIT program is too rigid in
its outlook. All of the provisions thus far discussed represent the ideals
of a developed country with very few concessions to developing coun-
tries for what the latter perceive to be important protections of their
national sovereignty."' Although the United States has had some suc-
cess in concluding BITs, an examination of those countries that are
parties indicates that only nations heavily dependent on U.S. aid may
be willing to accept the Model BIT in its present form.
As a tool for the protection of investment, the BIT has shown its
worth in both the success European nations have had in concluding
these treaties9 2 and the seriousness with which most nations have ad-
hered to the BIT provisions. The European BITs, however, contain a
measure of flexibility that the Model BIT does not.9 If the United
States is to succeed in expanding the opportunities for protected direct
investment abroad, some changes will have to be made in the Model
BIT. Perhaps a variety of Model BITs would be the best solution. By
having several standard models relating to the different types of nations
with which the United States is negotiating, the BIT could retain its
present speed and efficiency that arises from its precise outlining of
provisions.94 At the same time, the BIT would be better adapted to a
given country's individual needs. The United States does have vital na-
tional interests in safeguarding the rights of its citizens who invest
abroad, but a tailoring of the treaty to the variety of situations that
exist among nations today would be the most pragmatic and, it is
hoped, the most successful avenue to take.
3.1. Acceptance of the Model BIT
A pattern seems to be emerging among the countries with which
the United States is able to negotiate and conclude BITs based on the
terms of the Model BIT. The countries who have thus far agreed to
91 See Note, supra note 19, at 956-57.
92 See Bergman, supra note 19, at 10 (by the late 1970s, over 170 BITs had been
negotiated in Europe). But see Bilateral Treaties Not Directing Capital to LDCs that
Sign Them, U.N. Study Finds, 3 U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 14, at 447 (Apr. 2,
1986) [hereinafter U.N. Study] (U.N. study stating that BITs are not increasing direct
investment into developing nations that enter the accords).
" See supra notes 58-90 and accompanying text.
See generally Bergman, supra note 19, at 42-43 (arguing that BIT provisions
must be drafted narrowly or they will not provide the stable investment environment
required).
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sign and ratify the Model BIT with its original terms are among those
countries most dependent on the United States for aid. Two of the four
nations that receive substantial American aid are Egypt and Turkey.9
After Israel, Egypt received the most American governmental aid in
1984 through foreign grants and credits, military aid, and direct foreign
aid.96 In that same year, Turkey received the third largest amount of
military aid and foreign grants and credits, and the sixth largest
amount of foreign aid.97 Both Egypt and Turkey experienced massive
economic crises in the late 19700~*8 The United States was part of an
international group that joined together to prevent the collapse of the
Egyptian and Turkish economies.99
There were valid reasons for the United States to pursue a BIT
with Egypt, such as Egypt's strategic importance, its favorable attitude
toward foreign investment, the substantial amount of U.S. private in-
vestment already in place, and the open-door policy established in
1974.100 None of these reasons, however, explains the willingness of
Egypt to sign a treaty with many provisions obviously objectionable to
the Egyptian Parliament,0 1 thus supporting the view that these devel-
oping countries accept basically abhorrent provisions because of a
pressing need for foreign investment and a great reliance on U.S. for-
eign aid. 02 Others argue that developing countries believe BITs can be
beneficial, noting that: (1) developing countries often initiate discussions
" The other two countries are Israel and Pakistan. See Radke & Taake, Finan-
cial Crisis Management in Egypt and Turkey, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 325, 334
(1983).
11 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT OF
THE UNITED STATES 802-07 (104th ed. 1986) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF
THE UNITED STATES]. Egypt received $1,923 million in foreign grants and credits,
$1,367 million in military aid, and $853 million in foreign aid. Id. at 829-30.
11 Id. Turkey received $718 million in military aid, $443 million in foreign grants
and credits, and $138 million in foreign aid. Id. It is interesting to note that although
Turkey received the sixth largest amount of foreign aid in 1984, it received the third
largest amount in 1983 ($285 million) and in 1982 ($300 million). Id.
98 See Radke & Taake, supra note 95, at 325.
" See id. at 327, 331 (the United States helped to restructure the Turkish econ-
omy and provided funds for Egypt).
100 Law No. 43 of 1974 concerning Arab and Foreign Capital Investment and
Free Zones, Arab Republic of Egypt, Official Gazette No. 26, at 366-74 (June 27,
1974) (Egyptian embassy trans.), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 1500 (1974): see also United
States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Egypt and Panama, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 491, 501-02 (1983).
101 U.S.-Morocco Initialing, supra note 14, at 755.
102 But see Voss, supra note 70, at 373 n.26 (arguing that the bilateral treaty
safeguards the developing country's ability to modify the arrangement and that the
protection of foreign investments attracts "desirable capital investment"); MONTREAL
CONFERENCE, supra note 30, at 25 (stating that the initiative for treaties often lies with
developing countries and that such treaties are concluded between developing
countries).
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with developed countries to establish BITs; (2) BITs between develop-
ing countries exist; and (3) many developing countries have enacted leg-
islation dealing with foreign investment in much the same manner as
does the BIT.10 3 These facts indicate that many developing countries
wish to sign BITs, although they may not wish to sign a BIT contain-
ing the provisions in the U.S. Model BIT. It seems likely that the need
for foreign aid may be a controlling factor in determining how willing
developing countries will be to sign U.S. BITs.
It is difficult to predict based on aid statistics alone whether or not
a country will sign the Model BIT because of the impact political ten-
sions may have on the negotiating process. The United States has re-
cently signed new treaties with several developing countries. An exami-
nation of some of these countries and a few countries with which the
United States is currently negotiating may be helpful in determining
the future success of the BIT. The U.S.-Senegal BIT,1" which was
signed but has not yet been ratified, was declared to be "closer to the
general BIT prototype than either of the two previous treaties (Egypt
and Panama)."1 0 5 It is unclear whether the failure to ratify has been
caused by the reluctance on the part of the United States or Senegal.
Statistics show that, in 1982, the United States awarded Senegal the
ninth largest amount of foreign grants and credits in Africa, and the
seventh largest amount of foreign aid. 06 Even with this data, it is diffi-
cult to predict if the treaty will be ratified as it is, with modifications,
or not at all.
It is likely that the U.S.-Costa Rica BIT will be ratified in the
near future. Costa Rica is a recipient of aid under the Caribbean Basin
Initiative1 0 7 and is just recently recovering from its worst economic cri-
sis, which occurred in the early 1980s.' 08 Other Caribbean Basin Initi-
103 MONTREAL CONFERENCE, supra note 30, at 25.
104 U.S.-Senegal BIT, supra note 13.
110 U.S.-Africa Signing, supra note 12, at 448.
106 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 96, at 827-30.
Senegal received $74 million in foreign grants and credits and $35 million in foreign
aid. No statistics are available for the amount of military aid received. Id.
'o0 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp. 1 1983).
The Caribbean Basin Initiative originally included the following countries in its aid
packages: Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Panama,
Saint Christopher - Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad
and Tobago, and the Netherlands Antilles. Later, new beneficiaries were added such as
Belize, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Montserrat. Id. §
2702(b).
10 See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
CENTRAL AMERICA: THE DEEPENING CONFLICT, REPORT OF A CONGRESSIONAL
STUDY MISSION (Comm. Print 1984). Costa Rica's financial crisis was purportedly
caused by drastic increases in the international price of Costa Rica's exports, high en-
ergy import prices, a decrease in investment due to regional instability, and economic
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ative countries that have signed treaties with the United States include
Grenada and Panama. The situation with El Salvador' is a little
more confusing because of the political tension and instability in the
region. It seems likely, however, that a U.S.-El Salvador BIT will be
signed in the future. Two other signed but unratified treaties exist be-
tween the United States and Morocco, and the United States and Haiti.
At the same meeting in which Morocco and the United States signed a
BIT, the United States granted Morocco an additional twenty million
dollars in wheat shipments under the Food for Peace program."' Mo-
rocco had just recently received a blended credit offer of $244 million
from the United States."' Although it is likely that the U.S.-Morocco
BIT will be ratified in the near future, the U.S.-Haiti BIT may run
into problems due to the recent upheavals in Haiti." 2
3.2. An Amended Model
Working from the premise that the Model BIT as it now stands
will be acceptable only to those developing countries with whom the
United States has close financial aid ties, some changes in several key
provisions of the Model BIT may provide a variation of the Model that
will be more acceptable. Key areas of discontent include the dispute
settlement mechanism; the standard of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation; the national standard of treatment for investments; and
performance requirements. 1 3
3.2.1. Investment Disputes
Especially in the Latin-American countries that adhere to the
Calvo doctrine, the opposition to the submission of investment disputes
to the ICSID for third party arbitration has been very strong. Although
the U.S. government strongly objects to the settlement of investment
disputes on a government-to-government basis,"" perhaps this would
be a promising way to begin amending the Model. If the United States
regards government-to-government negotiations as too time-consuming
overextension and mismanagement. Id.
109 El Salvador, a focus of U.S. political concern for many years, receives a sub-
stantial amount of aid from the U.S. For example, in 1984, El Salvador received $454
million in foreign grants and credits from the United States, $197 million in military
aid, and $161 million in foreign aid. STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 96, at 827-30.
110 U.S.-Morocco Initialing, supra note 14, at 755.
111 Id.
112 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
113 See supra notes 58-90 and accompanying text.
114 U.S.T.R., supra note 66, at 1003.
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and too politically based, an arbitration panel composed of members
from the United States and the host nation could be created for the
settlement of disputes. This alternative, however, might still be rejected
by many countries.
Another alternative could be to put a third party arbitration clause
of some type into the treaty, and the details of the clause could be
worked out with the individual countries. For example, the PRC has
expressed a preference for the Swedish international arbitration tribu-
nals, if there is to be any third party arbitration at all, because they see
Sweden as the most neutral Western country. " 5 This would retain the
U.S. goal of third party arbitration while increasing the adaptability of
the Model. The arbitration clause may still be objectionable to many
countries that follow the Calvo doctrine because of the doctrine's stress
on the treatment of foreigners in the same manner as citizens in the
area of investment dispute.'
A clause outlining the types of disputes most commonly found and
outlining mutually acceptable ways of resolving standard problems
could simultaneously provide guidance and protection for the investor
while allowing the Calvo adherents freedom from the imposition of
third party arbitration.
3.2.2. Expropriation and Nationalization
It is impossible to remove completely conflicts between the United
States and the developing nations over the question of nationalization
and expropriation because of the sensitive nature of the topic and its
implications for national sovereignty."' A modification, however, in ei-
ther the method of valuation or the application of the standard of valu-
ation could be made so that the standard would be acceptable to both
parties for the purposes of the treaty. The United States might be able
to gain acceptance of the going concern method of valuation, which is
acceptable to U.S. interests."" It might also be possible to create a
modified standard of value, one evaluating both the flow of the invest-
ment's earnings and the value of the property determined as of some
predetermined date.
Another approach would be to divide the economy of the host
country into categories that could accomplish the goal of flexibility
without forcing the United States to abandon all adherence to the fair
115 Note, supra note 69, at 133-36.
16 See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
I'8 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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market value scheme of valuation. Certain sectors of investment in the
host country's economy could be exempted, just as the current Model
BIT allows certain sectors of the economy to be listed in the Annex of
the FCN treaty as exempted from the national and most-favored-nation
standards of treatment.119 Areas of the economy that the developing na-
tions believe are vital to their political and social development could
either be completely exempted from any prearranged valuation stan-
dard or could be classified as receiving a lower standard of valuation,
such as a going concern value. Although this would provide less, if any,
protection for the U.S. investor in those sectors of the economy ex-
empted from the fair market value standard, it would at least allow
conclusion of a BIT so that some protection for the investor would be
established. It would leave the investor free to choose whether or not to
invest in a less protected area of the economy.
3.2.3. Standard of Treatment
To avoid the problems of sovereignty and national control inherent
in the question of what standard of treatment to grant foreign invest-
ments (national or most-favored-nation), perhaps the adoption of a uni-
versal standard of treatment in a form slightly different than that sug-
gested by some European nations would be best.120 Both the national
and most-favored-nation standards of treatment necessarily fluctuate
depending on how the host government is regulating its nationals or
third parties. In periods of political unrest or economic crisis, both stan-
dards could prove to be quite restrictive to the foreign investor. A uni-
versal standard could be created that listed the protections allowed. Of
course, this standard could only work well if it were a universal stan-
dard. If each country had to negotiate an independent standard of treat-
ment with every other country, it would likely deteriorate into a contin-
ual renegotiation of standards depending on which country last received
a particular concession. However, if a universal standard could be
agreed upon among at least a few nations, this would be a better solu-
tion than the current debate between the national and the most-fa-
vored-nation standards.
3.2.4. Performance Requirements
The United States has stated repeatedly that it wishes all perform-
ance requirements be banned and that it desires to see this provision
9 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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enforced. 121 Unfortunately, this is one area where the United States
may have to give up its demands. In two out of the three treaties al-
ready concluded with the nations most likely to conform to the U.S.
Model BIT provisions, performance requirements have not been
banned.1 22 It is even more unlikely that the United States will gain
acceptance of this provision in treaties with countries less willing to
comply with U.S. wishes.
Perhaps the United States can restrict some of the import and ex-
port requirements that fall under the heading of performance require-
ments. It may not be possible to remove performance requirements such
as local content requirements, and it may not be in the best interests of
the United States to insist upon their removal. The United States has
repeatedly claimed that a large part of the focus of the BIT program is
on stimulating the development of less-developed nations.1 2 The ban-
ning of requirements that would cause a channeling of money into the
local economy and a resulting spur to the local market is hard to jus-
tify. Such a ban appears to be contrary to the enunciated goals of the
program.
3.3. Countries Where the BIT Does Not Fit
There are some developing and developed countries for whom the
Model BIT does not seem to provide even a workable framework. The
United States has conceded that certain countries do not appear to need
BITs.124 However, there also appear to be countries, with which the
United States is negotiating BITs, that might fit better into a different
treaty framework or set of agreements than that provided by the Model
BIT.
Countries such as Japan and the PRC, that already have Treaties
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, might do better with an up-
dated framework of the FON treaty rather than negotiation of a
BIT.1 25 This solution has already been suggested in the case of Ja-
pan.126 The PRC could be a candidate for the same solution. Both the
PRO and Japan are more highly developed nations than a majority of
the other countries with which the United States is negotiating BITs.
121 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
122 U.S.-Turkey BIT, supra note 13, art. II, para. 7; U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note
13, art. II, para. 7.
121 See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
124 U.N. Study, supra note 92, at 447 (stating that countries like Brazil and Mex-
ico did not need BITs because they were already able to generate sufficient investment).
125 U.S.-Japan FCN, supra note 15; U.S.-Republic of China FCN, supra note
15.
126 U.S. Seeking BIT With Japan, supra note 21, at 686.
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The level of the country's development, as well as the existing treaty
framework, are important elements in determining how to approach the
issue of foreign private investment. The more developed a nation is and
thus the greater bargaining power it can consequently wield in negotia-
tions with the United States, the less likely it seems that the BIT pro-
gram will be either an appropriate or a successful vehicle for the estab-
lishment of investment protection.
The BIT signed between the PRO and Sweden highlights the
problems the United States might have in trying to conclude a BIT
with the PRO.12 The provisions of the Sweden-PRC BIT differ dra-
matically from the U.S. Model BIT. For example, the Sweden-PRC
BIT contains only a most-favored-nation standard of treatment for in-
vestments. It also contains no fair market value standard of valuation
for expropriation, no clause banning performance requirements, and no
international arbitration clause.1 28 The United States has had substan-
tial problems trying to negotiate a BIT with the PRO and, in fact, the
negotiations have broken down several times.1"9 The best solution in
this situation is neither a total revamping of the Model BIT, nor an
abandonment of all hope for negotiating an investment treaty with the
PRO. Instead, an updating of the existing FCN to include more spe-
cific protections for foreign investments, though not as detailed as those
found in the BIT, would better serve all interests.
The United States is also trying to negotiate BITs with a host of
northern and western African nations.1 "' The African nations with
which the United States is currently negotiating are predominantly
poor nations that have only recently become independent." They are
plagued by a number of problems including poor education and trans-
portation facilities, cultural conflicts, the inheritance of artificial bor-
ders due to the European occupation of the region, inequities in devel-
opment, and problems inherent in smaller countries.13 2 In the past few
decades, the African countries have attempted to establish regional ties
and regional trade blocs.1 3 Many of these regional arrangements, or-
127 See Bergman, supra note 19, at 12-17.
128 See id.
"I Conference Speakers See Immense Business Opportunities in China, 19 U.S.
Export Weekly (BNA) No. 12, at 445 (June 21, 1983).
130 See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
131 Id.
13' Ajomo, Regional Economic Organizations: the African Experience, 28 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 58, 101 (1976).
133 See, e.g., Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWA), May 28, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1200 (1975) (signatories include
Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mau-
ritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta); Charter and
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ganized solely for economic cooperation, have proven difficult to main-
tain, however, due to the dissimilar political systems among the nations
involved."" A type of treaty that differs from the Model BIT might
also be the most appropriate way to approach these developing African
nations.
Although BITs have been signed but not ratified with Morocco,
Senegal, and Zaire, it is unclear whether these BITs will succeed with
the other African nations, or if they will even be ratified in the coun-
tries where they have already been signed. At present, the African na-
tions may not be in the same position as, for example, the Latin or
Central American nations. A U.S. government and business mission to
Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Nigeria found that the small
businessmen were the most successful in concluding contracts in these
nations, and that "in many countries you see they actually prefer deal-
ing with small businesses .... ,, 35 Perhaps the establishment of some
type of FCN would be the most appropriate way to begin comprehen-
sive relations and investment reciprocity with these nations. Several na-
tions already have FCNs with the United States. 3 ' In such cases, an
updating of the current investment framework is probably what is
needed. For many of the nations with which the United States has no
FCN, the establishment of an FCN would lay the groundwork for the
protection of persons, property, and investments abroad.
The framework of the Model BIT is too narrow and too focused
on the amount of investment to facilitate interaction with many of the
African nations with whom the United States is negotiating. Their con-
cerns are more broadly based and their opportunities for and interest in
foreign private investment are on a different scale than many other de-
veloping countries. The African nations are still in the position of hav-
ing to build regional trade groups, of encouraging interaction with
outside nations and of developing a climate suitable for foreign private
investment. Their position is in striking contrast to that of the Latin
and Central American countries. Although subject to great problems of
Regulations of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), June 27,
1966, reprinted in 6"I.L.M. 53 (1967) (signatories include Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Repub-
lic, Niger, Ruanda, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta).
113 Ajomo, supra note 132, at 82-84.
135 U.S. Government-Business Mission Returns from Africa with Contracts, En-
thusiasm, U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 392, at 445 (Jan. 26, 1982).
136 See Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Sept. 16, 1836, United States-Morocco, 8
Stat. 484, T.S. No. 244-2, reprinted in MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTER-
NATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS, 1776-1909, S. Doc. No. 357, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
1212 (1910).
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internal unrest, a majority of the Latin and Central American countries
already have a sense of national sovereignty and a regional conscious-
ness. For nations that have an interest in U.S. investment and a sense
of their own national needs, a form of the BIT program will probably
fulfill the needs of both the United States and the developing nation
involved. For countries still beginning to develop internally and region-
ally, an updated model of the FCN would create the greatest amount of
protection for the foreign private investor while addressing the whole
range of concerns existing between the United States and the host
country.
4. CONCLUSION
The development of the BIT program was a step forward for the
United States in the negotiation of protections for the investments of
U.S. citizens abroad. The traditional framework of investment rela-
tions, embodied in a series of FCNs, did not meet the needs of many of
today's investors. The BIT program established by the United States,
however, is too rigid in its application. The United States has been very
forceful in requiring that certain provisions be included in the treaties
and, moreover, that they be included as specified by the U.S. For the
future success of the BIT program, variations on the Model BIT
should be developed so that the treaty program as a whole can find
wider acceptance. A series of Model BITs, each containing provisions
that incorporate the concerns of the different regions of developing na-
tions, may be the best approach. Although the United States may have
to relinquish some of the provisions that it believes are important in
order to accommodate developing countries, greater protection will be
provided for U.S. investors abroad in the long run.
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